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ABSTRACT 
This study explores the effects of EU policy on Block Exemption within the 
European Automotive industry.  The approach taken was to gain exclusive access 
through industry insiders to four key car manufacturers with operations in the UK 
but European aspirations, namely, Honda, Audi, Toyota and the now defunct MG-
Rover.  The opinions gained from senior management within these companies 
combined with a study of the European policy and current Supply Chain business 
thinking presented some compelling findings. 
Although there are differences between the four companies in their 
approach to this Block Exemption legislation, there are also some interesting 
although perhaps unsurprising protectionism views of the established position of 
these businesses.  Certainly one of the key battle lines to be drawn going forward will 
be with the spare parts and after market where the competition for vital post-sales 
servicing revenues will intensify over the coming years, perhaps loosening what has 
been a domain controlled absolutely by the manufacturers.  The long term 
implications and strategy adopted by the manufacturers may yet have the EU 
reaching for the rulebook again. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
As Europe nowadays enjoys a common market, threats as well as opportunities come 
along with it. Therefore one of the regulatory bodies of the European Union, the 
European Commission, needs to make sure competition is made fair and that it 
doesn’t affect the market. 
Decisions made by the European Commission affect all the industries within 
the EU and there can be the case that in particular situations exceptions to the law are 
made. 
This was the case of the automobile industry. The automobile industry has 
been granted exemptions from some of the competition regulations present in the 
Treaty of Rome.  As this is a unique industry, it shouldn’t be compared to other 
manufacturing industries due to the complexity of the products it produces, so the 
European Commission decided that the exemptions made sense. 
However, these privileges have given too much power to vehicle 
manufacturers, compromising the other sectors that cooperate with the industry, and 
the overall market as well. Due to this the European Commission has reformulated the 
competition laws for this industry, limiting the amount of control given to 
manufacturers, who are still enjoying block exemptions. 
When hearing about these changes and how it would bring implications to the 
supply chain of vehicle manufacturers the author thought it would be very interesting 
to make a study of the effects of the changes within the regulations, by way of 
informed opinion from senior industry leaders. 
So the purpose of this paper is mainly the one of drawing conclusions on 
whether the changes will be effective and how they will affect the major players of 
this industry within the market.  
This area of research was not covered in the literature in depth. The authors are also 
aiming to contribute in the area of research with this up-to-date comprehensive paper. 
One of the main difficulties encountered when performing the research was 
the fact that these changes in the EC competition rules have taken place quite recently 
so the academic literature available on the current situation within the industry is still 
quite limited. 
However, this has been a much- discussed subject in the business and 
automotive media in the past couple of years; so updated information in newspapers 
and magazines is quite abundant. 
 
1.2 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
1.2.1 Secondary Research 
The author has performed extensive reading on supply chain management and on the 
European Commission competition policies, in order to provide a good theoretical 
background on the subject being studied. This has included books, academic journals, 
Newspaper and magazine articles, and Internet sources. 
Illustrations to support the theories can be found along the text of this paper. 
A list of all the literature and sources of information used for the outcome of this work 
can be found in the reference section of this paper. 
 
1.2.2 Primary Research 
The main thrust of this paper revolves around four in-depth interviews conducted with 
senior figures at Toyota, Honda, Audi and MG-Rover, prior to the demise of the 
OEM.  
 
2. SUPPLY CHAIN MANAGEMENT 
As the European Union members have amalgamated and developed as a group, cross-
border relationships have flourished.  This has certainly been very apparent when 
looking at the infrastructure surrounding supply chains both in the automotive 
marketplace and elsewhere.   
Although the principles and practices of the modern supply chain may be 
familiar to the reader, it may be appropriate to outline some of the key principles by 
way of a reminder and to serve as a framework for the later industry interview 
analysis.   
A supply chain can be defined as a “network of organisations that are 
involved, through the upstream and downstream linkages, in the different processes 
and activities that produce value in the form of products and services in the hands of 
the ultimate consumer”. All organisations that are part of the chain will depend on 
each other, although they will not be co-operating closely. This concept cannot be 
compared to the one of vertical integration as firms are now focusing on what they are 
specialised in and have a differential advantage, outsourcing everything else. An 
example of this can be automobile manufacturers that have once made their own 
components but now are only assembling the finished product. There can also be the 
case of firms subcontracting their manufacturing. (Christopher, 1998) 
 2.1 Structure of a Supply Chain 
As already mentioned, a supply chain can be divided into upstream and downstream 
activities, being first the inward movement of materials (activities in front of the 
organisation) and second the outward movement of materials (activities after the 
organisation). While the upstream activities are divided into tiers of suppliers, the 
downstream activities are divided into tiers of customers.  
(Waters, 2003, p.8) 
A first tier supplier is the one who sends materials directly to the operations, 
the second tier supplier supplies the first tier and so on back until it reaches the 
original source of materials.  With customers, there is also a similar division, where 
the first tier customer will be the one that gets the product directly from the 
organisation; a second tier customer will get the product from a first tier one etc.  The 
following diagram shows the several activities in a supply chain. 
 
As most companies get their materials from many different suppliers and sell to many 
different customers, it will either converge with raw materials moving in through the 
tiers of suppliers, or it will diverge with the moving out of products through the tiers 
of customers (Waters, 2003, p.8).  
 
2.2 Value Chain 
The competitive advantage of a firm cannot be understood if we look at the company 
as a whole, as it results from the various activities it performs in the design, 
production, marketing, delivery, and support of its product.  
 
As the value chain developed by Michael Porter shows, a firm will gain competitive 
advantage if it performs the above mentioned strategic activities at a lower cost or 
better than the competition.  
 
The basis for differentiation, analysing the value chain of a firm, will be the value 
chain of suppliers that create and deliver the purchased inputs to be used in the chain 
of a firm. Besides delivering, they can also influence the performance of a firm in 
many other ways. Many products will then pass through the channel value chains on 
the way to the buyer. They will also perform other activities that affect the buyer and 
also influence the activities of the firm. The final product will then become part of the 
buyer’s value chain. Finally, a firm’s differentiation will consist of its’ role and its 
product’s role in the buyer’s value chain, determining the buyer’s needs. “Gaining and 
sustaining competitive advantage depends on understanding not only a firm’s value 
chain but how the firm fits in the overall value system.” (Porter, 1998) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.5 The use of supply chain and logistics management to achieve competitive 
      advantage 
It can be argued that logistics, and the effective management of a supply chain, is of 
great help in achieving Porter’s value chain.  The value chain, as mentioned before, 
consists of a firm achieving both cost advantage and value advantage over other 
competing firms within the same industry. So how can the management of supply 
chains and logistics help? 
Logistics can further improve productivity or cost advantage, in the sense that 
it can create better capacity utilisation, reduce inventories and closely integrate 
suppliers. It can also contribute to a better customer service giving that way a value 
advantage to the firm, as that will be one of the bases for differentiation. So the aim of 
logistics management is to integrate the marketplace, the distribution network, and the 
process of manufacturing and procurement so that the level of customer service is 
high and of a low cost. Having achieved this, competitive advantage can then be 
gained against rival firms. (Christopher, 1998) 
Previously it was common to see adversarial rather than co-operative 
relationships between suppliers and downstream customers. Today that still happens, 
in the sense that some companies will try to obtain cost reductions or increase profits 
through their supply chain partners. However, they are undermining the fact that this 
kind of relationship is not making them any more competitive, as in the end all the 
costs will be reflected in the price paid by the consumer. Companies that understand 
this situation will tend to make the whole supply chain more competitive by the value 
it can add to the whole process and the cost that can be reduced overall. Therefore, 
competitive advantage will not be achieved through company against company, but 
through supply chain against supply chain. (Christopher, 1998) 
 
3. THE EUROPEAN UNION AND COMPETITION POLICY 
The Treaty of Rome in 1957 established the European Economic Community with six 
members (France, Italy, Germany, Belgium, Netherlands and Luxembourg). This 
developed from the earlier European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), which tied  
together the coal and steel industries of France and Germany. From that stage the 
Community went through five major processes of development until the most recent 
one, the May 2004 enlargement. (Dicken 2003, p.151).  
 
The SEM has brought very positive effects to the business environment of Europe. 
There was a reduction of technical and regulatory barriers so that manufacturers could 
sell their products all over the European Union. Businesses were able to bid for 
contracts of the public sector outside their country and managed to operate more 
freely in the internal EU markets. Goods crossing the borders within the EU had no 
longer physical and administrative restrictions, and the free movement of capital has 
increased investments across-border. It has also allowed EU workers to move freely 
within the EU and have recognition of their higher education or professional 
qualifications in most cases. Consumers also enjoyed better prices as a result of the 
Single European Market, including a reduction in airfares and the average basket of 
groceries. (Mercado, 2001) 
The main reason behind the creation of the Single European Market in 1992 
was that the multiple internal barriers to trade and movement were adversely affecting 
the Community’s competitiveness face to global markets. So individual countries 
were engaging in tactics that would prevent or delay the importation of certain 
products from other Member States. Therefore the argument brought up by the 
Commission was that all these costs associated with the non-existence of a single 
market would lead to a potential loss in GDP and jobs, and weaken the Community’s 
ability to compete with Japan and the United States. (Dicken 2003, p.152) 
As the Member States of the European Union were finally enjoying a single 
market, there was the need for Competition law and Policy of the European Union to 
be created in order to guarantee the maintenance of liberal order and to ensure fair 
competition in the internal market of the Community. The articles and regulations on 
EU Competition Law only go as far as regulating practices that affect trade among 
Member States, therefore it is important to distinguish national from EC law. 
(Mercado 2001, p.166) 
While the majority of competition and anti-trust legislation at a national level 
is only concerned with maintaining effective competition and fair trade as a 
mechanism for consumer protection, the EC competition law only seeks that same 
maintenance of competition and fair trade at a secondary level, being its main 
objective the promotion of Community integration (Maitland-Walker 1995, p.3). So 
the Commission has defined the objectives of competition policy as the prevention of 
“companies… re-establishing frontiers abolished 25 years ago through the less visible 
but equally effective means of market sharing agreements and export bans. Both 
consumers and traders benefit from this policy: consumers because they can enjoy the 
lowest prices available in any of the Member countries; traders because they have 
access to a market on a European scale;” and of “excessive concentrations of 
economic power from damaging the interests of consumer (or competitors…”  
(Maitland-Walker 1995, p.3).  This led on to the EC developing and refining some 
specific laws and exemptions, where appropriate, that include the Automotive 
Industry with which this paper is primarily concerned.  
 
3.1 Article 81(3) of the European Commission  
In Article 81(3) there are two types of exemption: individual exemptions that are 
granted to a particular agreement, decision or concerted practice; and block exemption 
that is provided to categories of agreements, decisions or concerted practices.  
(Albors-Llorens 2002, p.47) 
In the past, a broad view of Article 81(1) meant that many vertical agreements 
would fall under Article 81(3). The fact that the process of gaining an individual 
exemption was difficult has made block exemptions a very important matter, as an 
agreement that fell within its terms would benefit automatically from being exempt 
from the prohibition of Article 81(1). However, it hasn’t always been easy to 
determine whether an agreement was infringing Article 81(1) or meeting Article 
81(3)’s criteria. In practical terms, if a business has the concern that it might infringe 
Article 81(1), it might be advised to have its agreement fall within a block exemption.  
(Jones & Sufrin 2004, p.654) 
The power of granting exemptions is attributed solely to the European 
Commission, although it may be subject to review by the European Court of Justice. 
Initially this aimed to ensure a coherent and uniform development when interpreting 
and applying Article 81(3) EC. However, a programme of reform has been outlined 
for the decentralisation of the application of Article 81(3) EC so that national courts 
and national authorities can apply it. (Albors-Llorens 2002, p.47) 
 
 
 
 
3.2 Evolution of Block Exemption Regulations 
Block Exemption is the term used for the Regulation of the European Commission 
that has been created with the original aim of exempting vehicle manufacturers from 
the provisions of the treaty of Rome that prohibit vertical restraints to trade. In 
practical terms, it would be illegal without this exemption for vehicle manufacturers 
to use Selective and Exclusive Distribution systems as it gave them complete control 
over the distribution networks, generating therefore anti-competitive behaviour.  
(Europe Automotive Insight)  
However, since the regulation has first been introduced in 1985 (123/1985) it 
has been subject to modifications, first ten years later in 1995 (1475/1995) and, most 
recently in October 2002 (1400/2002).  
The following table below outlines the restrictions placed on dealers by the 
original block exemption and its 1995 revision   
 
Restrictions Placed on Dealers by 
the Original Block Exemption and 
Subsequent Revision  
  
Original Agreement 1985 Revision 1995  
Dealers were not allowed to sell 
competing brands. 
Dealers were allowed to 
distribute multiple makes of cars 
but only through different 
showrooms and under different 
management teams. 
Franchise agreements ran for four 
years. 
Agreements extended to five 
years. 
Franchise termination period is for 
one year.  
Termination period extended to 
two years. 
Spare parts to be supplied only by 
the OEM. 
Dealers allowed to sell non-OEM 
parts provided they were of 
equivalent quality. 
Sales targets set by the OEMs. Sales targets now set by mutual 
agreement, with disagreements 
sent to arbitration. 
 
Table 3: Restrictions Placed on Dealers by the Original Block Exemption and 
Subsequent Revision in 1995 
Source: 
www.worldmarketanalysis.com/InFocus2002/articles/westeurope_blockexempt.html 
 
3.2.1  1400/2002 
This new regulation applies specifically to agreements in the motor vehicle 
distribution and came to replace the previous 1475/1995 regulation. The application 
of the previous Block Exemption caused some controversy as it was considered to be 
too severe. Also, the Commission was worried that it was giving too much power to 
OEMs and limiting dealers’ freedom; it hadn’t achieved the integration of national 
markets; and the vehicle manufacturers hadn’t properly implemented it.  
(Jones & Sufrin 2004, p. 676, 677)  
The European Commission published in November 2000 a review of the 
Block Exemption for motor vehicle distribution and found that the system was failing 
to meet the important objectives it had been set for, when established in 1995. A more 
thorough description of the problems encountered by the EC can be found in the table 
below. 
 
Below is an outline of the several problems with the 1995 Block Exemption 
(1475/95) identified by the EC  
1. “Large international price differentials, with obstacles to arbitrage 
a)  Margins in new car sales are low, so dealers have little incentive to sell cars      
outside their territories, which they will not then go on to service. 
b)  Dealers were found to impose longer delivery times and higher deposits for 
foreign buyers. 
c) Dealers cannot get hold of vehicles to sell to foreign buyers. 
d) Dealer’s sales to foreign buyers may not count towards sales targets set by 
VMs. 
e) Intermediaries (firms which fulfil orders placed by buyers) are affected by 
these same problems and, in addition, can buy no more than 10% of a 
dealer’s output nor access the same discounts as domestic buyers. 
f) Independent producers of spare parts unable to compete with VMs 
g) Economic abuses by VMs: VW, Opel and DC 
h) Lack of multi-brand retailing, which is regarded as efficient and pro-
competitive 
 
EC views problems resulting from this as: 
a) Lack of achieved economies of scale 
b) Lack of efficient cost structures 
c) Excessive risk for dealers resulting from their dependence on a single 
manufacturer 
i) Insufficient competition between dealers 
EC alleges competition is weakened by VMs: 
a) Setting sales targets are reward schemes, which do not give dealers an 
incentive to maximise sales 
 There are insufficient volume discounts 
 Bonuses are “not transparent” 
b) In some cases, enforcing resale price maintenance 
c) Reserving the largest retail contracts (with fleet buyers) for themselves 
j) Inefficient new car distribution infrastructure 
k) Independents unable to compete with dealers in repair (too expensive) 
Under the 1995 BER, the EC states that: 
a) Independent repairers do not have access to original spare parts at same prices 
as dealers 
b) Independent repairers do not have access to technical information or 
diagnostics on same terms as dealers 
c) Hence independents are not properly able to compete with dealers on price 
l) Some limited allegations of poor after-sales service quality 
m) Some of these problems are made worse by dealers weakness relative to 
VMs” 
Source: Adapted from Tim Ogier’s Presentation Slides, The New BER: Intentions and 
Innovations, PriceWaterhouseCoopers, 30/09/2002 
 
 
 
The new Block Exemption regulation came into force on 1 October 2002 (see 
Appendix 1 to see the actual publication of the regulations) aiming to address some of 
the difficulties that the old Block Exemption regulations faced, and taking into 
account the particularities of the automotive industry. More particularly, this new 
Regulation aimed to encourage competition between dealers, make it easier to 
purchase new vehicles abroad, and to create better price competition. This regulating 
reform aimed to promote competition at all the levels of car distribution, including the 
distribution of motor vehicles, the issues of repair and maintenance, and the supply of 
spare parts.  (Jones & Sufrin 2004, p. 677) 
 
OVERHAULING EUROPEAN AUTO DISTRIBUTION 
Europe’s car-retailing system was built decades ago, when dense and integrated sales 
and service networks were needed to satisfy demand in growing markets and to offer 
qualified repair service for cars whose quality and performance were generally worse 
and more varied than they are now. 
To stimulate the large investments that were necessary, regulators allowed the 
automakers to grant their franchised dealers sales areas in which nobody else could 
sell their cars—an arrangement known as the exclusivity rule.  
Taken together, the rules created an integrated automotive value chain with limited 
competition for dealers and automakers alike 
The result has been limited competition both among dealers and between 
dealers and other sales channels. In the after-sales market, manufacturers were 
allowed not only to support their own dealerships’ service centers with original parts, 
full technical information, training, and the official stamp of authorization but also to 
exclude all others from such benefits. Taken together, these rules have created an 
integrated automotive value chain with limited competition for dealers and 
automakers alike (Exhibit 1). In fact, net profits from spare parts, service contracts, 
financing, and insurance subsidize sales of new cars. 
 
 
There has long been a need to consolidate overly dense European networks—
Germany alone has more car sales points than does the entire United States—and to 
expand the range of retail channels to reduce distribution costs in a market suffering 
from overcapacity.  
 
New rules of the game 
All this is about to change as a result of new regulations, adopted in July 2002, that 
for the most part will be fully implemented by October 2003.  
Under the new rules, manufacturers will have to choose between revised 
versions of the exclusivity and selectivity rules. If they opt for exclusivity, they can 
continue to grant and dictate exclusive sales territories for their distributors, thus 
limiting competition among dealers selling the same brand. In the new system, 
however, the dealer has the right to sell cars to nonauthorized resellers, which can in 
turn sell them anywhere in the European Union. 
Using a reseller that isn’t a direct competitor is a way for the dealership to sell 
additional cars with minimal effort: it makes a profit on the difference between the 
wholesale price it gives the manufacturer and whatever higher price the reseller is 
willing to pay.  
Most manufacturers will probably choose selectivity, which allows them to 
ban unauthorized resellers. 
So most manufacturers will probably choose selectivity, which allows them to 
ban nonauthorized resellers, such as supermarkets. The downside for the manufacturer 
is that dealers will then be allowed to market and sell cars directly to consumers 
anywhere in the European Union and also, from October 2005 onward, to open new 
outlets anywhere in it. The result, inevitably, will be more competition among dealers 
selling the same brand. 
Regardless of whether a manufacturer opts for exclusivity or for selectivity, 
additional price pressures are bound to come from two other regulatory changes. This 
rule is intended to spur cross-border trade and thus to accelerate the harmonization of 
car prices, which now differ substantially across the European Union. 
Even more important, the new rules threaten the share and margins of the car 
manufacturers in the after-sales market, in which they currently make most of their 
profits, by breaking down the car business value chain. Dealers will have the choice 
of providing service themselves, either at their sales points or elsewhere, or of 
outsourcing service altogether.  
Consumers should benefit from all these changes in the form of lower prices. 
Spare-parts providers too are likely winners, since they will be able to sell original 
parts directly to service shops, without sharing their margins with car manufacturers.  
 
Three strategic directions 
Producers have a choice of three strategic directions, which have in common a need to 
improve the distribution system’s performance 
Manufacturers have a choice of three strategic directions, each emphasizing one or 
more of the industry’s value drivers—selling more cars, finding ways to keep margins 
as high as possible, and protecting share and margins in the lucrative after-sales 
market—to maintain their profitability in Europe. What these three alternatives have 
in common is the need to improve the performance of the distribution system. Each 
manufacturer must assess its brand strategy, growth aspirations, starting position, and 
capabilities in its different markets and decide on the right strategy for each of them. 
 
Product specialist 
The first option for manufacturers is to become product specialists, concentrating on 
volume by making cars widely available at competitive prices while maintaining 
reasonable margins.  
This arrangement is quite usual in most other industries where consumers can choose 
from a variety of distribution channels.  
There have been isolated European initiatives to sell cars in supermarkets—
Germany’s Edeka has sold the Fiat Punto, and cars have been offered, in cooperation 
with one or more dealers, in the El Corte Inglés and Alcampo hypermarkets in Spain. 
But no manufacturer has made a concerted effort to develop sales through low-cost 
channels, despite latent demand: a McKinsey automotive-consumer survey showed 
that 41 percent of respondents in Germany could imagine buying a car from a 
supermarket, while 17 percent could imagine buying one directly from the 
manufacturer over the Internet, without a test drive. 
Making the transition to the product specialist strategy is a bold move posing 
some likely difficulties. For one thing, manufacturers would have to give careful 
consideration to the possibility that using this approach in one market might damage 
their brands in another.  
 
Downstream integrator 
Another response to the new regulatory environment would be to become a 
downstream integrator. In this strategy, the manufacturer moves aggressively to 
acquire dealers, to take control of its retail network in selected markets, to maximize 
margins on its cars, and to protect its share of the service and spare-parts market.  
Ownership of a distribution network secures a 100 percent share of its retail 
margins and a profitable service business, in which manufacturers can insist on the 
use of their own original spare parts. The potential gains are suggested by the sizable 
gap in the number of cars sold per outlet and per salesperson in Europe as compared 
with the United States (Exhibit 2), where dealerships tend to be larger. 
 
Nevertheless, ownership too entails major risks. Dealerships owned by manufacturers 
have difficulty matching the retail skills of independent operators, which evince much 
greater entrepreneurial drive.  
This strategy will probably be most attractive to premium-brand 
manufacturers, which regard the brand experience as vital and tend to have higher 
retail margins for their products. To compensate for the investments and risks 
involved, this strategy will probably be used primarily in markets where a brand has 
both a strong position and high volumes and where margins ensure healthy returns. 
Franchising agreements will be more favored in less attractive markets. 
 
World-class franchise partner 
Finally, there is a less aggressive but equally challenging strategy, which is likely to 
be chosen in most markets by a majority of car manufacturers that have a brand price 
premium to defend but are unwilling or unable to buy and run their own dealer 
networks.Success will require a new attitude, including a greater overall focus on 
distribution and the adoption and management of new retail channels consistent with 
the brand image of the manufacturers.  
Manufacturers choosing this strategy will still depend heavily on their 
franchised dealers, over which they will have less power. They must now act 
decisively to improve the way their cars are sold, by cooperating more closely with 
dealers.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4. ANALYSIS 
The reforms in regulations that took place in October 2002, with regards to 
competition policy, and more particularly block exemptions, have caused a change of 
scenario for the automobile industry in Europe. It has affected the whole supply chain 
of the industry. 
Previously, the findings served the main purpose of giving some background 
knowledge on competition policy of the European Union, focusing on block 
exemptions, and on the automobile industry and the major drivers within it.  This final 
third of the paper focuses on some unique primary research with key decision makers 
in the European Automotive market.  
The interviews that the author has been granted are from people that work for 
three leading car manufacturers – Honda, Audi , MG-Rover together with a fourth 
interview with one of Toyota’s managers in the UK, performed by Vigneshwar C. 
Selvakumar for the purpose of his MSc. Thesis. Also academic journals, newspaper 
and magazine articles are being used as references in this paper, as this will be the 
literature with the most updated information. 
One of the factors that has influenced the reforms in the EC block exemption 
regulations was the former European competition commissioner’s (Mario Monti’s), 
concern over the enormous differences in car prices before tax within Europe. The 
reforms that took place in October 2002 on how cars should be sold and serviced took 
the European automotive industry by storm, but Monti predicted the changes to be for 
the best, allowing for more competition which may very well increase with the recent 
EU enlargement (a. Karen Carstens, Economist, EIU, 10.02.2003). 
Thanks to the previous block exemption regulations vehicle manufacturers 
were not bound by some of the provisions of the Treaty of Rome, more particularly 
the ones that concerned vertical restraints on trade. This way, car manufacturers were 
allowed to have at the same time Selective and Exclusive Distribution systems in 
order to control the distribution of vehicles and spare parts, and all this without 
performing illegally (The Economist, Survey: Driven to Distraction, Dec 2001). After 
the reforms in 2002 car manufacturers were forced to choose either one system or the 
other. This meant that they are now supposed to either assign one exclusive sales 
territory with the dealer (exclusive dealership); or chose a system where dealers have 
the choice of opening more delivery points and showrooms (selective dealership). 
A one-year period was given to car manufacturers so that they could adapt to 
the reforms in the BE regulations, therefore the changes in the market and its effects 
are still quite recent. So from 30 September 2003 (exactly one year after the reforms), 
car manufacturers have had to give valid and detailed reasons to drop franchised 
dealers. What happened in that gap year was that a lot of re-franchising took place as 
manufacturers were trying to consolidate their networks of dealerships before the 
deadline was over. According to Alan Pulham, director of the UK National Franchise 
Dealers Association, manufacturers have performed questionable methods and 
actions, within that year. One of their tactics was to persuade their dealers into selling 
them large shareholdings in their businesses (b. Karen Carstens, Economist, EIU, 
10.02.2003). 
One example of the early effects of the end of the changes in block exemption rules 
was Daimler Chrysler that went ahead with the restructuring of its Mercedes-Benz 
sales network in the UK, when it anticipated the reforms in the BE regulations to 
come in 2002. The law at the time allowed them to restrict who would sell their 
vehicles and with the changes that soon would be coming through, they have started 
preparing for it by re-shaping their sales structures. DC reduced its 155 UK dealer 
network to only 35 independent dealers. It has created a network of 11, mostly owned 
by the company, ‘experience centres’, with the support of smaller vehicle centres. 
This resulted in the dealers filling for lawsuit, taking DC to court. (Datamonitor 
News, DaimlerChrysler: appeasing the soon-to-be ex-dealers, 04.07.2001) 
Audi, Honda, MG-Rover and Toyota are among the leading car manufacturing 
companies in Europe that have been affected by the changes in block exemption 
regulations.  
 
 
 
Manufacturer’s View of the Principle of Block Exemptions 
Mr. Kevin Brown, Corporate Sales Director at MG-Rover, believes the previous block 
exemption regulations were fair and had valid reasons to exist. In his view “vehicles 
are complex pieces of equipment and when serviced by the wrong hands with the 
wrong equipment could be dangerous”, so there needs to be the ability to look 
properly after vehicles in the aftermarket. He doesn’t agree that price differentials are 
related to BE, but to taxation rules instead. 
Mr. Paul Hunter, Network Development Standards Manager at Honda, shares 
the same view. He stated that cars are complicated and special tools that need to be 
maintained and the reasons to why the previous BE regulations existed is that if they 
are not maintained properly there can be dangerous consequences to it and the EC 
recognised the special need to protect those businesses because if they were 
completely free anyone could look after the vehicles and probably not doing it 
effectively. With the new regulations, cars will still have to be maintained so therefore 
more training and investment equipment will have to be invested in. 
Mr. Mark Roden from Toyota believes that the latest changes in the BE 
regulations were a way of the European Commission taking the control out of vehicle 
manufacturers’ hands, and giving more responsibilities to dealers in the sense that the 
customer gets the best deal. However, the EC is forgetting that the dealer is in 
business to make profit; so benefiting dealers doesn’t mean that the customer gets the 
best deal in the end. 
Ms. Elaine Turner from Audi felt that the legislation meant that dealers 
focused more locally although it perhaps did not benefit customers as much as it may 
have done. 
 
Aftermarket Profit Stream 
“We need to be aware that there are basically two areas that most manufacturers can 
go down. One is quantity and the other one is quality, and basically the route that 
Audi decided to go down servicing was the quality route, so basically anyone can 
service our vehicles provided that they can meet our standards in terms of equipment, 
training and premises. So I think that, effectively, that allows us to sort of control the 
standards that people get at an authorised Audi repairer because, of course if your car 
is in the first three years of its warranty you can’t take it anywhere other than an Audi 
authorised repairer anyway, and after that time, really, the way that we have very nice 
facilities, the actual Audi centre facilities are better than anything else that is 
available, so we like to think that people still use our services because of the 
experience and the customer service that they actually get from servicing their Audi 
vehicle there as opposed to an independent repairer”. (Elaine Turner, Audi) 
As Elaine Turner from Audi clearly illustrates above, the emphasis is very 
much on the dealership customer experience as a means of maintaining customer 
loyalty to the designated Audi dealerships.  So, very much of a pull process into the 
dealerships preventing a leakage of customers to alternative servicing outlets. 
 
Dealer and Franchise Partner Relationships  
In the UK the total number of franchised dealers has fallen from 22,000 in 1970 to 
6,000, and PricewaterhouseCoopers estimates that within a decade the number could 
fall to 4,000 due to the rapid change in the business landscape. The previous block 
exemption regulations have caused too many dealership networks to exist within 
Europe, and the number is almost twice as large per car sold in the US. Dealers sell 
very few cars to be able to survive on sales alone and service is what provides them 
with revenues. Before the block exemption reforms servicing and repair represented 
60 % of a dealer’s profit, however, they now have to face an increase in competition 
from repair specialists (b. Karen Carstens, Economist, EIU, 10.02.2003). 
“I would say in a lot of ways it has improved. The relationship that we have 
now is more consultative, because you know, we don’t have things like post code 
areas, but obviously in terms of the standards that we set and that we are audited 
against, we need to work and support our centres to make sure that having selected 
these people to represent and under the quantitative policy that we’ve got for sales in 
particular, we selected these people, these franchisees based on the fact that we want 
them to represent our branch so we do have to make sure that in terms of the 
standards that we set and that we are audited against that we do everything to make 
sure that they are fully compliant”. (Elaine Turner, Audi) 
Mr. Kevin Brown has stated that reforms in the BER have changed 
relationships with dealers at MG-Rover, in the sense that they have become more 
commercial and less contractual. Their fairly rigorous standards of the past have 
changed dramatically with the changes in regulations, which made car manufacturers 
lose some of their commercial power over dealers. 
He also believes that the changes will not bring more competition to dealers 
and will probably benefit them better than customers. This is because dealers will be 
able to control better the way vehicles are marketed and obtain more profits due to 
scale efficiencies, as they will use their increased purchasing power and buy cars in 
bulk, not leaving much of a chance to smaller dealers, which ends up reducing 
consumer choice. He even compares it to the groceries market and the way 
supermarkets have eroded smaller shops. It didn’t make them bring more consumer 
choice or made groceries cheaper; it just brought more profits to supermarkets and he 
believes that a similar situation will happen to cars.  
Although MG-Rover still has to comply with the changes in the competition 
rules, the exceptions the manufacturer still enjoys are around the fact that it is still 
able to grant exclusivity of operation, keep the standards and give people exclusive 
rights in certain geographic areas. However, there are other competition rules that still 
have to be complied, like not fixing prices or constraining supplies. The only 
restrictions the changes have brought them were around making restrict supplies of 
car parts and being able to terminate franchises (Kevin Brown, MG-Rover). 
Honda enjoys exemption from some of the regulations as the EC has 
understood that the company isn’t changing, leading or shaping the market, which 
gives them some more freedom of action when compared with other leading 
manufacturers. Honda is in a position that it can appoint individual sales points, 
although they are not free to appoint in the service or after sales on the basis of 
geographical location. Here we can see that sales regulations differ from the service 
ones (Paul Hunter, Honda). 
Elaine Turner suggested that Audi has some strict policies around dealers in 
terms of the location, facilities, servicing equipment and the labour force and its 
associated training.  If a dealer can meet all of these requirements, then there is no 
reason why it cannot be an Audi dealership.  However, although Audi operates its 
dealerships through a franchising network, it owns many of the sites currently in 
operation.   
“The EC has agreed with manufacturers that the automobile industry is a 
mature industry that doesn’t need a great deal of regulations to be managed, so it is 
giving the industry some guidelines, and at the end if the customer is not being treated 
fairly, further action will be taken. However, the EC leaves at the manufacturers’ 
discretion how to do it” (Mark Roden, Toyota). 
As for the price differentials mentioned by Mario Monti, Paul Hunter said that, 
although the retail price for cars isn’t set, it would have to be set at an acceptable level 
after the consumer has paid tax, so that it fits in the market where the car is being 
sold. In the case of countries with very high taxation, manufacturers have no other 
choice than to sell cars at a loss, so that the consumer can still afford the after-tax 
price. That is the case of Denmark, Cyprus, Malta, Gibraltar, and Belgium. Therefore 
taxation, and not block exemption, is the prime cause of price differencials, being 
both top and bottom prices managed by the law that controls the tax rates. 
 
After 2010 
In 2010 the current regulations on block exemptions will go through a reform. There 
is speculation that the block exemption on the automotive industry will be removed 
completely. This would take away from vehicle manufacturers all the control they 
used to enjoy over the market, and make them face the fair game of competition.  
When asked if the company was taking any measures to ensure direct control 
with regards to distribution, in case block exemptions are completely removed by 
2010, Mr. Kevin Brown has replied that MG-Rover doesn’t see the need for owned 
outlets. What would be done would be to give dealers strong economic reasons to stay 
with the manufacturer in the market, and with that achieved there wouldn’t be the 
need to have manufacturer-owned sites. Mr. Paul Hunter said that Honda has 200 
outlets in the UK and around 1500 across Europe so it would become a challenge for 
the manufacturer to own its outlets.  He has said that in general manufacturer owned 
outlets don’t perform financially as well as franchises as there is great difference in 
the retailing of cars and the retailing of other products. 
“Basically our view point is that we are an importer and that we are not 
retailers, we’ve just built an 8 million pounds Audi experienced centre in Glasgow 
and basically Audi own that premises, we don’t manage it and that’s the route that we 
go down. So we do own a lot of the centres, and particularly the new experienced 
centres that we’re buying and that we’re setting up, but in actual terms of running 
them no, we will always go down the franchising route”. (Elaine Turner, Audi) 
 
However, Kevin Brown believes that even if BERs are removed, there will still be 
unique legislation due to the unique nature of the industry. He is of the opinion that if 
BERs were to fall or be renewed there would still be legislation applied specifically to 
the automobile industry. On the other hand Paul Hunter has a different view. He 
doesn’t believe it will be unlikely that the BERs will be removed as in his view the 
EU commissionaires are people that have never worked in the industries they are 
regulating and some of them are public sector professionals who have never worked 
in an industry at all. The automobile industry is definitely a very unique industry as 
cars, which are high capital goods, are being bought and sold in the retail market, 
which is something not many other industries are doing. 
This is also at odds with Elaine Turner from Audi who does not see the 
Automotive industry as unique, “I don’t think it’s a unique industry, we sell a product 
at the end of the day, lots of other people sell a product and therefore I don’t think 
we’re unique. If someone can prove otherwise, then no, I don’t think they’ll ever be 
totally listed but my own personal viewpoint is no, that we’re not unique. We are a 
manufacturer who manufactures a product and have retail outlets to sell that product, 
and I don’t think that that makes us unique to other people, personally. Block 
exemptions only existed because we considered ourselves to be unique, I don’t think 
we are particularly unique and I think the only way that they could ever not be listed 
is if it could be proved that it was unique and they needed to be there”. 
 
CONCLUSION 
The study that has been performed throughout this paper has allowed the conclusion 
that although there is a great will on part of the European Commission of ensuring the 
best fairness possible within the European Union, a lot more will have to be done, 
although it is very critical to take drastic measures within the competition rules of this 
industry, as this is a very unique and mature industry. Changes could very well give 
with one hand and take away with the other. 
Although dealers now have more freedom, in the sense that they don’t have to 
be exclusive to only one car manufacturer, smaller dealers will be facing unfair 
competition, as the stronger ones, with more purchasing power will be benefiting 
from scale efficiencies because they will have the resources to buy cars in bulk. 
Also, independent garages that are now allowed to provide after-sales service 
or maintenance to cars still under the manufacturer’s warranty, in order to do so, will 
have to comply with the manufacturer’s standards and invest in equipment and further 
training. All this comes at a price, and the customer in the end will be the one paying 
for it. 
For a supply chain to bring value to an organisation there needs to be a full 
integration of all intermediaries and activities within the chain. At the beginning of 
the paper the theories around this are exploited and adapted to the particular cases of 
the automotive industry. With the constant changes in the picture of the industry’s 
regulations in Europe, the value chain has to be in constant change and update so that 
it achieves value delivery and vehicle manufacturers can remain competitive in the 
market. 
Supply Chain is a fairly new concept in the business world. However, it is 
considered importance nowadays one of the driving forces in achieving superior 
performance.  
Companies more and more are starting to outsource some of the additional 
activities that they used to perform before and tend to concentrate on the actual thing 
they are specialised in producing or assembling. 
  The management of a supply chain consists is basically the integration of all 
the intermediaries that cooperate in the production the central organisation performs. 
So these will be suppliers, wholesaler, retailers and in the end, the consumer. 
The effective management of the integration of these activities is very critical 
for the performance of the organisation as it will be the determinant of how the 
company will perform compared to its competitors, so Michael Porter’s theory on 
value chain is very intimately linked with the management of a supply chain. 
In this paper the theories of supply chain and value chain are applied to the 
automotive industry, where an outline is given on how this industry integrates the 
various intermediaries. 
The focal centre of this study was the fact that the automotive industry in 
Europe enjoys some exceptions in regards to competition rules set out in the Treaty of 
Rome. Those exceptions were called block exemptions and gave total control to car 
manufacturers, allowing them to have a more powerful position than the other sectors 
of the industry, albeit, the aftermarket. 
The European Commission decided at the time that this was causing 
unfairness within the market and benefiting only the manufacturing sector. So 
changes to the regulations have been made in October 2002 in an attempt to revert 
this situation. 
Now, with the present regulations, car manufacturers have had to change their 
posture in regards to the aftermarket, i.e. dealers, independent part manufacturers and 
independent garages. 
Before, manufacturers could appoint both selective and exclusive dealerships. 
Now they will have to either opt to one system or the other, and can’t have both at the 
same time. They can no longer demand that their dealers sell original parts to 
customers, so they are allowed to sell compatible parts from independent 
manufacturers. Also the aftercare market isn’t restricted to authorised dealers 
anymore. Independent garages, provided that they will comply with the manufacturers 
standards can provide the service now. 
The intention of these changes has been to benefit all the players that take part 
in the activities performed by the automobile industry, i.e. dealers, independent part 
manufacturers, independent garages and, of course, customers. 
However, there has been speculation that this is rather idealistic, as the unique 
nature of this industry might bring some setbacks to the recent changes. 
It is believed that dealers will not benefit from this in general, as stronger 
dealers  will take over the market for that sector. Consequently, customer might lose 
out as well as this may lower down the options for consumers, who won’t be enjoying 
competitive prices. 
Also the idea that customers will benefit from independent garages also 
performing after-sales service to new cars is a very optimistic one, as this will cause a 
lot of costs so that they can comply with the manufacturers’ standards. In the end it 
might all come out of the customer’s pocket. 
Quoting Mr. Kevin Brown, maybe there was a valid reason, after all, for the 
existence of the previous block exemptions. The fact that this is a unique and mature 
industry makes it sensitive to changes, and things might just get worse off than they 
were before for the customer.  
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